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Bean Counters: The Eﬀect of Soy Tariﬀs on Change in
Republican Vote Share Between the 2016 and 2018
Elections
Olga V. Chyzh and Robert Urbatsch
March 11, 2019
Abstract
How do trade wars aﬀect presidential support? President Trump's aggressive tariﬀs
on China despite his largely rural electoral support base provide a unique opportunity
to analyze the relationship between international trade policy and domestic support. If
trade-related considerations were ever decisive to American voters, the stark decrease
in soy prices, a direct eﬀect of Trump-initiated tariﬀs immediately preceding the 2018
midterm election, serves as a critical test for studying their eﬀect. This letter shows a
robust inverse relationship between county-level soybean production and the change in
Republican vote share between the 2016 and 2018 congressional elections.
The American public deems foreign policy a low-salience matter under most circumstances
(Kleinberg and Fordham, 2017; Lavine et al., 1996; Rosenau, 1961; Williams, Brule and
Koch, 2010). Barring reactions to an occasional ongoing active military conﬂict, that is,
voters are relatively insensitive to international aﬀairs. Trade policy, in particular, is noted
for lacking electoral resonance (Guisinger 2017, although see Fordham and McKeown 2003).
While other countries periodically might have electoral battles fought around trade policy
(e.g., Brodie, 1989; Irwin, 1994; Martin, 1954), the United States' size and self-suﬃciency
traditionally have limited public interest in international economic aﬀairs.
Enter President Donald Trump, who shook up the typically obscure issue of trade by
launching a series of aggressive trade wars with other countries (Noland, 2018). This, in
turn, provoked retaliation, most notably by China (Li, Zhang and Hart, 2018; Liu and Woo,
2018). In light of America's extensive agricultural exports to China, this exchange of trade
barriers sits uneasily with President Trump's very rural-skewing base of support (Monnat
and Brown, 2017). China's targeting of tariﬀs was particularly threatening to the soybean
sector: as the world's largest importer, China had considerable power in soybean markets
(Taheripour and Tyner, 2018). Indeed, upon imposition of Chinese tariﬀs, prices in the
American soybean market fell rapidly; while a bushel of soybeans had a cost within a few
cents of $10.25 for most of spring 2018, the price fell by over a dollar over the month of June
as tariﬀs bit, falling to a ten-year low in September. Even after some year-end recovery, the
price remained around $9.00 at the close of 2018. Soybean producers' revenue thus fell by
over 10% from what might have been anticipated during the planting season, and proﬁts fell
by concomitantly further.
Nor was the American soybean sector a trivial economic interest: with around $41 billion
worth of output in 2016 and 2017, it represented the second most valuable crop in the United
States (behind only maize), and one where output had increased dramatically in recent
yearsan increase largely spurred by increased Chinese demand (USDA, 2018). Moreover,
the costs of this trade conﬂict would have spilled well beyond soybean producers themselves in
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communities heavily invested in soybeans, as providers of services or even homeowners would
have seen their sales and assets fall concomitantly with soybean farmers' reduced incomes
(Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). While Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue announced a
multibillion-dollar bailout program to ameliorate the eﬀect of the trade war on farmers,
relatively few of these funds were promptly disbursed, and the eﬀort was perceived as not
nearly covering farmers' losses (Rappeport, 2018).
This context provided unusually stark impetus for voters in soybean-producing areas to
pay attention to, and make electoral decisions on the basis of, trade policy. Indeed, support
for Trump and his Republican Party marks something of a critical test of the relevance of
international political economy for American voters: with a clear shift in market conditions
widely attributed to American trade-policy choices, trade-policy had unparalleled visibility
and importance. If trade-related considerations were ever decisive in Americans' decisions
of whether and for whom to vote, for those living in soybean-producing areas, the November
2018 general election would be the time.
To determine whether voters punish the incumbent President's party for economically
consequential international trade policies, we model the change in the Republican vote share
between the 2016 and 2018 elections to the House of Representatives as a function of county-
level soy production. We ﬁnd strong evidence that voters hold the president's party account-
able for trade policies where those policies have direct economic impact. Counties that are
most reliant on soy production have shifted against the Republican Party by roughly 50
percentage points more than we would otherwise expect.
Trade Policy and Voting Behavior
Research on whether voters hold politicians accountable for trade policy oﬀers mixed re-
sults. Several studies have demonstrated a lack of a relationship between individual support
for speciﬁc trade policies and how such policies would aﬀect these individuals' personal in-
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come (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006, Mansﬁeld and Mutz 2009, although see Fordham and
Kleinberg 2012). Some interpret these ﬁndings as more evidence of the well-known public dis-
interest when in comes to foreign policy issues (Lavine et al., 1996; Rosenau, 1961; Williams,
Brule and Koch, 2010). Others argue that the seeming public's apathy on trade issues is a
relatively recent phenomenon, resulting from the post-World War II fractionalization of US
protectionist interests in response to the shift from manufacturing to service jobs, growing
orientation towards imports, and the weakening of labor unions (Hiscox, 2002). As a result
of these structural changes in the US economy, a host of other political issues with larger
and less splintered support bases simply overshadowed trade policy, allowing politicians and
economic elites to take advantage of the resulting lack of accountability and shape more lib-
eral trade policies than would be supported by the general public (Guisinger, 2017). A third
perspective, known as the sociotropic explanation, posits that average voters are generally
unable to correctly infer the consequences of speciﬁc trade policies on their individual income
(Kono, 2006; Rho and Tomz, 2017), and instead rely on easy-to-acces information about the
state of the local and national economy from the media, elite discourse, or organizations like
the AARP (DiGiuseppe and Kleinberg, 2018; Mansﬁeld and Mutz, 2009).
In the United States, the economic costs of free trade have been found to translate to
electoral penalties for the incumbents in two ways. First, locales that are most disadvantaged
by free trade may increase support for Democratic political candidates that favor worker
compensation and other redistributive policies (Che et al., 2016). Alternatively, the backlash
to free trade may lead to the rise of economic nationalisma protectionist sentiment that
attributes domestic economic misfortunes to the inﬂuence of out-groups (e.g., foreigners).
Research shows evidence of both types of electoral responses to economic shocks: Autor
et al. (2017) ﬁnds that voters in ethnically diverse districts respond to economic shocks
by supporting politicians that advocate for worker compensation policies, while districts
with majority non-Hispanic white populations react by increasing support for right-wing
candidates with protectionist views. Margalit (2011) ﬁnds that, while job loss generally
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results in anti-incumbent eﬀect at the polls, this eﬀect doubles in size when the job loss is
due to oﬀshoring as opposed to other factors such as domestic competition (also see Jensen,
Quinn and Weymouth, 2017; Kleinberg and Fordham, 2013).
While most research so far has focused on testing for evidence of backlash against free
trade and globalization, the election of Donald Trump set up unique conditions for a critical
test of the reverse eﬀect of whether voters are also likely to punish politicians for adverse
economic eﬀects of protectionism. Elected on a platform of economic protectionism and
xenophobia, Trump was quick to deliver the promised tariﬀs against China, which were
promptly reciprocated by Chinese tariﬀs against US-produced soy cropsa production staple
of Trump's agricultural support base. The sharp decrease in demand for soybeans led to a
substantial price drop, as well as uncertainty about the future of the entire $41 billion US
soy industry as well as other economic activity in soy-producing communities (since trade
exposure spills over to the county (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001)). If Trump's conservative
rural support base were ever to infer a direct link between trade policy and their personal well-
being and hold the Republican Party accountable, this eﬀect should show in the outcome of
the 2018 congressional elections. This strong policy salience is, however, countered not only
by the low baseline lack of interest in foreign aﬀairs but also by intense partisan polarization
(Abramowitz and Webster, 2016; Gelman et al., 2016). The goal of this letter is to use
data on the change in the county-level Republican vote share between the 2016 and 2018
congressional elections to test for evidence of shrinking support for the Republican party in
locales that are highly reliant on soy production.
Research Design
The dependent variable is the change in Republican vote share between the 2016 and
2018 general elections to the House of Representatives, ∆Republican Votes. We measure
this variable as an odds ratio of Republican-to-Democrat votes between the two elections,
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or Rep 2018/Dem 2018
Rep 2016/Dem 2016
. This measure allows us to account for change in the Republican-
to-Democrat vote share resulting from changes in each party's relative (Republican-to-
Democrat) vote share and relative turnout. A value of 1 indicates no change in the relative
vote share, higher values indicate changes in favor of the Republican party, and lower changes
indicate changes in favor of the Democrats. Eﬀectively an odds ratio, the measure allows for
interpreting results as percent changes. For example, a value of 1.1 would be interpreted as
a 10% increase in the odds that a local voter supported the Republican candidate, while a
value of 0.8 would mean a 20% shift in favor of the Democrats. To construct the measure,
we collected vote totals for the two major parties in the elections for the position of the
US House of Representative in the 2016 and 2018 general elections reported at the county
level.1 We excluded counties where elections were not contested in both election years, since
some states do not report votes for uncontested races, as well as results for Alaska (for which
county-equivalent units are not consistently deﬁned).2 The resulting sample includes 2414
counties from 49 states. All data were obtained from state-level Secretary of States or equiv-
alents (e.g., the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts). We log-normalized the
dependent variable in the statistical analysis, so that, e.g., doubling and halving the ratio
had symmetrical eﬀects.
Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution of the dependent variable. The prevalence of
the blue color is consistent with the blue wave trope used by the pundits to describe
widespread electoral gains by the Democrats in the 2018 elections. The map colors, of
course, are solely indicative of the change in vote share between the two elections, not of
1For states that report election results at the levels of precincts or municipalities, and
for counties split among two or more congressional districts, reports were aggregated to the
county level.
2Reported results do include results from Pennsylvania, which redrew Congressional-
district boundaries between 2016 and 2018. Omitting such redistricted counties from the
dataset does not substantially change results.
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the actual electoral outcome. For example, North Dakota elected a Republican to the US
House of Representatives in both the 2016 and the 2018 elections, albeit with a signiﬁcantly
narrower margin in all but one county. Whereas in 2016, in an average North Dakotan
county, there were almost 5 Republican voters for each Democratic voter, the corresponding
number in the 2018 congressional race was just under 3a 40 percent decrease. As some
initial evidence of voters punishing the incumbent party for consequential trade policies, we
see that some of the largest shifts against the Republican party (over 40%) took place in rural
agricultural counties of the Midwest and along the Missouri and the Mississippi riversareas
that correspond to the highest reliance on soy production.
The key independent variable is a county's economic reliance on soybean production.
For robustness purposes, we measure soy production in two ways: in millions of bushels and
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Note: Data obtained from the USDA.
in dollar sales. Both of these measures are based on 2012 ﬁguresthe most recent data
released by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA). Both measures of soy production
are log-normalized in the statistical analysis. Figure 2 shows the distribution of soybean
production by county.
We control for a number of factors that may inﬂuence vote choice and turnout, such
as county-level GDP/capita and its square term, percent unemployment, education, urban-
ization, percent of black and other minorities, percent of Hispanic and Latino population,
percent foreign population, as well as the percent margin that voted for Trump in the 2016
Presidential election. To account for possible district-level eﬀects, such as the incumbency
advantage and district's ideological leaning, we also estimate a second model on a subsample
of counties that are not split among two or more congressional districts. Data on county-level
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GDP were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis website. We measure educational
attainment using two variables: percent of the county popuation whose highest educational
attainment equals to a high-school degree or equivalent (variable High School), and as per-
cent of population whose highest educational attainment is a Bachelor's degree, Bachelor's.
Data on all demographic variables were obtained from the most recent release of the US
Census American Community Survey (20132017 averages). ∆Incumbency is an ordinal
variable that takes a value of -2 for districts that had an incumbent Republican candidate in
2016 but an incumbent Democrat candidate in 2018, -1 for districts that had an incumbent
Republican candidate in 2016 and an open-seat race in 2018 or an open-seat race in 2016
and an incumbent Democrat in 2018, 0 for districts where the incumbency status was the
same in both elections, 1 for districts that had an incumbent Democratic candidate in 2016
and an open-seat race in 2018 or an open-seat race in 2016 and an incumbent Republican
in 2018, and 2 for districts that had an incumbent Democratic candidate in 2016 but an
incumbent Republican candidate in 2018. District's Ideology is measured using the Cook
Political Report's Partisan Voting Index as of 2015, coded as the number of percentage points
more Republican than the country as a whole the district has voted in recent presidential
elections. All control variables were log-normalized as necessary.
We test our hypotheses by estimating a two-level ordinary least squares regression with
counties (level 1) nested within states (level 2) (Gelman and Hill, 2007). More formally,
index counties as i ∈ 1, 2, . . . , I and states as j ∈ 1, 2, . . . , J , then the expected ∆Republican
Votes in each county i that is nested in state j is modeled as:
∆Republican Votes ij = (α+αj)+β1 ∗Soy Production i+β2 ∗GDP/capi+β3 ∗(GDP/cap.)2i +
β4 ∗Unemployment i+β5 ∗High-School i+β6 ∗Bachelor's i+β7 ∗Urbanization i+β8 ∗Black i+
β9 ∗Other Non-White i + β10 ∗ Latinoi + β11 ∗ Foreign i + β12 ∗ Trump's Margin i + i + uj,
where α and αj are the overall and the state-speciﬁc intercept, respectively, β1 − β7 are
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Table 1: Change in Republican Vote Share Between 2016 and 2018 Elections as a Function
of Soy Production
coeﬃcient estimates on the covariates, while i and uj are county- and state-level random
components, respectively. For counties uniquely assigned to districts, district-level variables
are further added to this model.
Results
The results of the statistical analysis are presented in Table 1. In the ﬁrst two models, soy
production is measures in millions of bushels, whereas models 34 are estimated measuring
soy reliance in terms of soy sales (in USD). Models 1 and 3 are estimated on the full sample,
whereas models 2 and 4 are estimated on a subsample of counties that are not split between
congressional districts.
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Consistent with our expectation, the eﬀect of Soy Production is consistently negative
and statistically signiﬁcant in all model speciﬁcations. This indicates a direct relationship
between county economic reliance on soy production and decrease in Republican vote share
between the 2016 and the 2018 congressional elections, while holding all other variables
constant. To facilitate the interpretation of our model, we plotted the expected percent
change in Republican vote share as a function of county soy production in Figure 3. The
ﬁgure shows a drastic eﬀect: counties that are reliant on soy production even to a small degree
have shifted against the Republican party by anywhere between 25 and 50 percentage points
more than counties that produce no soy.
Control variables act in expected directions. Our model suggests that increases in Repub-
lican vote share were observed in counties with higher unemployment rates, higher percent of
population with no college education, and higher percent of black and Hispanic populations.
The latter ﬁnding is consistent with the premises of economic nationalism espoused by the
Trump administration (i.e. minorities are blamed for various social and economic problems).
A gain in Republican incumbency advantage, as measured by our ∆Incumbent variable is
also associated with expansion in Republican vote share, as one would expect. In contrast,
counties with higher proportions of college-educated populations and greater levels of urban-
ization were associated with decreases in Republican vote share between the two elections.
Trump's Margin is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, which indicates that counties that
Trump won by the largest margins exhibited the largest decreases in Republican vote share,
which is to be expected due to regression to the mean. Finally, District Ideology is negative,
possibly as a result of a regression to the mean eﬀectdistricts that voted Republican by
more points than the national average experienced a decrease in the midterm election.
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Note: All control variables are set to the values of an av-
erage rural county. Estimates obtained using coeﬃcient
from Model 1.
Conclusion
In studies of international political economy, the general public often appears as only marginally
sensitive at most to trade policy; when the public does demonstrate concern for trade, that
concern often seems more responsive to identity cues than personal pocketbook issues. How-
ever, in exploring the eﬀects of one particularly dramatic shift in trade policy preferences,
the United StatesChina trade war of 20172018 and its sudden imposition of restrictions on
American soybean exports, the above analysis ﬁnds strong eﬀects. Localities that were de-
pendent on soybean production and thus suﬀered most from the trade confrontation tended
to see relatively large shifts against voting for the incumbent President's party. This result
is particularly notable since most previous studies of trade-policy preferences have found
larger public responses in response to open trade policy, rather than to the protectionist,
higher-barrier policy examined here. Future research should complement this ﬁnding with
individual-level analysis to better examine who, exactly, responded to the change in trade
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policy. Was the eﬀect concentrated among farmers themselves, or did it extend to other lo-
cals? And did those who change their voting behavior actually switch parties, or, more likely,
simply become less likely to turn out to vote for their partisan preference? It is also worth
exploring responses to the ongoing trade conﬂict in other countries and industries. While
the context of the United States agriculture is sui generis, the potential for governments to
suﬀer electoral costs from trade wars may be expanding under the Trump administration.
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